The granularity of inquisitive and truthmaker content

Johannes Korbmacher

j.korbmacher@uu.nl

This work is licensed under CC BY 4.0

Aim
Compare hyperintensional frameworks from a logical perspective.
 
Sedlár (2019), Pascucci & Sedlár (2023)

TOC

  • Hyperintensionality
  • Logic
  • Comparison
  • Outlook

Hyperintensionality

Hyperintensional contexts are simply contexts which do not respect logical equivalence.

 

A hyperintensional concept draws a distinction between necessarily equivalent contents.

Def.
\(O\) is hyperintensional iff \[ \phi\dashv\vdash\psi\nRightarrow O(\phi)\dashv\vdash O(\psi) \]
  • Failure of substitutivity
  • Non-congruential operator

Questions

(Ciardelli, Groenendijk, Roelofsen 2018)

  • \(?\phi\dashv\vdash \phi\lor\neg \phi\) (Question)
  • \(\phi\lor\neg\phi\dashv\vdash\psi\lor\neg\phi\) (Classicality)
  • \(?\phi\dashv\vdash ?\psi \)

Because

(Fine 2011, Schnieder 2011)

  • \(\phi< Tr(\ulcorner\phi\urcorner)\) (Aristotle)
  • \(\phi\dashv\vdash Tr(\ulcorner\phi\urcorner)\) (Tarski)
  • \(\phi\dashv\vdash \psi\Rightarrow \theta < \phi \dashv\vdash \theta < \psi\) (Substitutivity)
  • \(\phi < \phi \)

FCP

(Hilpinen 1982)

  • \(P(\phi_1\lor\phi_2)\vdash P(\phi_i)\) (FCP)
  • \(\phi\dashv\vdash\psi\Rightarrow P(\phi)\dashv\vdash P(\psi)\) (Substitutivity)
  • \(\phi\dashv\vdash (\phi\land\psi)\lor(\phi\land\neg\psi)\) (Total possibility)
  • \(P(\phi) \vdash P(\phi\land\psi) \)

SDA

(Ellis, Jackson, & Pargetter 1977)

  • \((\phi_1\lor\phi_2)>\psi\vdash \phi_i>\psi\) (SDA)
  • \(\phi\dashv\vdash\psi\Rightarrow \phi>\theta\dashv\vdash \psi>\theta\) (Substitutivity)
  • \(\phi\dashv\vdash\phi\lor(\phi\land \psi)\) (Absorption)
  • \(\phi>\theta \vdash (\phi\land\psi)>\theta \)

Implications

  • Logically & philosophically relevant
  • Nolan (2012): Hyperintensional revolution
  • Rethink (formal) semantics!

Possible-worlds model

  • \(\llbracket \phi\rrbracket=\{w:w\vDash\phi\}\) (Propositions)
  • \(\phi \dashv\vdash \psi\Rightarrow\llbracket\phi\rrbracket=\llbracket\psi\rrbracket \)
  • \(\llbracket O(\phi)\rrbracket=f_O(\llbracket\phi\rrbracket)\) (Compositionality)
  • \(\phi\dashv\vdash \psi\Rightarrow\llbracket O(\phi)\rrbracket= \llbracket O(\psi)\rrbracket\)

The way forward

  • Williamson (2021, forthcoming): Wait, I can explain!
  • A scientific revolution!
  • New frameworks:
    • Truthmaker semantics (Fine & Jago forthcoming)
    • Inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli, Groenendijk, & Roelofsen 2018)

Logic

Perspectives

  • Linguistics, metaphysics, CS, ...
  • Logic valid inference

Assumptions

  • Methodological pluralism
  • Logics are models of valid inference
  • Agnostic about propositions
Def.s
 
Logics

\((\mathcal{L},\vdash)\), where \(\vdash~\subseteq \wp(\mathcal{L})\times\mathcal{L}\) is a consequence relation

 
Models
\((\mathcal{A},C)\), where \(C:\wp(A)\to \wp(A)\) is a closure operator with \[\Gamma\vdash\phi\Rightarrow \forall h:L\to A,  h(\phi)\in C(h(\Gamma))\]
Def. (Odintsov & Wansing 2021)
\((\mathcal{L},\vdash)\) is hyperintensional iff \(\exists O\in\mathcal{L}\), \[\phi\dashv\vdash\psi\nRightarrow O(\phi)\dashv\vdash O(\psi)\]
Aim
Determine a 'natural' relation \(R\) with \[\phi R \psi\Rightarrow O(\phi)\dashv\vdash O(\psi)\]
 
Granularity problem (Schwarz & Bjerring 2017)
Co-hyperintensionality
  • Algebra
  • No Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
Def.s
Frege relation
\(\Lambda C=\{(a,b):C(a)=C(b)\}\)
Tarski congruence
\(\tilde{\Omega} C\) the largest\(_\subseteq\) congruence below\(_\subseteq\) \(\Lambda C\)
Reduced model
\(\tilde{\Omega} C=\Delta A\)
Def.s
Basic full models

\((A,C)\preceq (A,C')\) iff $C(X)\subseteq C'(X)$

Smallest\(_\preceq\) models
Full models
\(\Lambda C\)-quotients of basic full modles
Def.s
Associated algebras (Font 2016)

\(\mathfrak{A}=\{A: (A,C)\text{ is a full reduced model}\}\)

Granularity

\(\mathfrak{G}\) is the absolutely free (term-)algebra of type \(\mathfrak{A}\) generated by the propositional variables \(\mathcal{P}\):

\(\forall A\in\mathfrak{A}~\forall f:\mathcal{P}\to A~\exists !h:G\to A, h_{\restriction \mathcal{P}}=f\)

Def
Comparative granularity

\((\mathcal{L},\vdash_1)\preceq (\mathcal{L},\vdash_2)\) iff \(\exists h:\mathfrak{G}_1\hookrightarrow\mathfrak{G}_2\)

  • A hyperintensional hierarchy!

Comparison

Aim
Investigate hyperintensional capabilities of frameworks

Inquisitive semantics

  • Inquisitive propositions ()
    • Information state: \( s\subseteq W\)
    • Issue: \(I\neq\emptyset\subseteq\wp(W)\), where \[s\in I~\&~t\subseteq s\Rightarrow t\in I\]
    • Proposition: \(P=(s,I)\)
  • Semantic clauses: \(\llbracket\phi\rrbracket=(s,I)\)
  • Under the semantics, the inquisitive propositions form a Heyting-algebra
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_{Inq}\nvDash P\lor\neg P=Q\lor\neg Q\)
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_{Inq}\nvDash P=(P\land Q)\lor(P\land \neg Q)\)
  • the \((\mathbf{P},\land,\lor)\)-subalgebra is a lattice
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_{Inq}\vDash P=P\lor (P\land Q)\)

\(\Vdash\) Truthmaker semantics

  • Truthmaker propositions
    • State space: \(S,\sqcup\)
    • Condition: \(P\subseteq S\), where \[s,t\in P\Rightarrow s\sqcup t\in P\]
    • Proposition: \((P^+,P^-)\)
  • Semantic clauses: \(\llbracket\phi\rrbracket=(P^+,P^-)\)
  • Under the semantics, the truthmaker propositions form a De Morgen bisemilattice (Brzozowski 2000)
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_{Tms}\nvDash P\lor\neg P=Q\lor\neg Q\)
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_{Tms}\nvDash P=(P\land Q)\lor(P\land \neg Q)\)
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_{Tms}\nvDash P=P\lor (P\land Q)\)

Outlook

A 'universal' \(\mathfrak{G}\)?

  • Hornischer (2017), \(\exists\phi_{1,2},\psi_{1,2},\mathcal{O}_1,\mathcal{O}_2\)
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_1\parallel \mathfrak{G}_2\)
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_0=\mathfrak{G}_1\cap \mathfrak{G}_2\)
  • \(\mathfrak{G}_\bot=\bigcap\mathfrak{G}=\mathcal{L}\)

Thanks

Abstract

The aim of this talk is to compare truthmaker semantics and inquisitive semantics from the perspective of hyperintensional logic.

Following Cresswell (1975), we call an operator, \(O\), hyperintensional just in case \(O\) doesn’t respect logical equivalence, meaning that \(O(\phi)\) and \(O(\psi)\) can differ in truth-value even when \(\phi\) and \(\psi\) are logically equivalent. The research of the last decades has shown that a wide range of philosophically significant operators are, in fact, hyperintensional—including (but not limited to) knowledge and belief operators, question and explanation operators, imperative and permission operators, and many others.

From a logical perspective, the thing about hyperintensional operators is that they force us to banish from our logical models of propositions an incredibly useful assumption, namely that (logically) equivalent formulas are synonymous (express the same proposition). But what, if anything, replaces the assumption? This question, also known as the Problem of Grain, is sometimes put as: How hyperintensional does our model of propositions have to be?

Truthmaker semantics and inquisitive semantics provide competing (?) models of propositions that have proven independently fruitful for the logical study of hyperintensional logic (Fine 2017, Jago 2017, Ciardelli, Groenendijk, and Roelofsen 2018). In this sense, they provide different answers to the Problem of Grain. But is any of them right? Are there logical reasons to prefer one model of propositions over another?

In this talk, I’ll sketch a framework for answering questions of grain from a logical perspective, and I’ll apply the framework by comparing the truthmaker model of propositions to the inquisitive model.

References

  • Ciardelli, Ivano; Groenendijk, Jeroen & Roelofsen, Floris. 2018. Inquisitive Semantics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Cresswell, M. J. 1975. “Hyperintensional logic.” Studia Logica 34(1): 25-38.

  • Fine, Kit. 2017. “A Theory of Truthmaker Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction and Negation.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 46(6): 625-674.

  • Jago, Mark. 2017. “Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions.” Argumenta 2 (2): 293-308.