*“The twenty-first century is seeing a hyperintensional revolution.”*

*“The twenty-first century is seeing a hyperintensional revolution.”*

Most of my research centers around issues of *hyperintensionality*. Roughly, a context is said to be *hyperintensional* iff it does not respect (classical) logical equivalence (Cresswell 1975, 25). Traditionally, hyperintensionality is seen as an epistemological phenomenon: paradigmatic examples of concepts that create hyperintensional contexts are knowledge and belief. But in recent years, this orthodoxy began to crumble. Philosophers have argued that hyperintensionality affects concepts from different fields across the discipline, ranging from ethics (e.g. permission, see Fine 2014) to metaphysics (e.g. dispositions, see Jenkins & Nolan 2012).

Consequently, my research touches on different fields of philosophical logic, ranging from deontic logic over formal epistemology to modal logic. What unifies my research is a strong interest in *truth-maker semantics* as an approach to hyperintensional semantics. The idea of truth-maker semantics is that we can give the semantic content of a statement by saying what makes the statement true and what makes it false: by giving its *truth-makers *and *false-makers*. This idea traces back to early work by Bas van Fraassen (1969), but recently Kit Fine has independently re-discovered truth-maker semantics as a promising approach to hyperintensional semantics (Fine 2016). In my work, I use truth-maker semantics to tackle technical and philosophical problems in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics.

Besides my interest in hyperintensionality, I also have a standing interest in the philosophy of mathematics, especially mathematical structuralism. Roughly, mathematical structuralism is the view that mathematics is not concerned with the “internal nature” of its objects, but rather with how these objects “relate to each other” (Resnik 1997, Shapiro 1997). In my work, I am mainly interested in foundational questions of mathematical structuralism.